We examine a legislative voting game where decisions are being made over both ideological and distributive dimensions. In equilibrium legislators prefer to make proposals for the two dimensions together, despite having preferences that are separable over the two dimensions. The equilibria exhibit interaction between the ideological and distributive dimensions, and consequently in any equilibrium there is a positive probability that a proposal is made and approved which excludes the median legislator (as de ned over the ideological dimension), in contrast with a game where no distributive decision is being made. Thus, the set of legislators who approve any winning proposal (i.e., those who weakly prefer the proposal to the expected continuation of the legislative game), do not always consist of ideologically similar legislators. Moreover, in any stationary equilibrium there is more than one ideological decision that has a positive probability of being proposed and approved.
Introduction
In this paper we examine the equilibrium patterns of proposed and approved decisions, as well as the winning coalition structure in a simple legislative game. The understanding of such issues is fundamental to the understanding of the operation of a legislature or committee, or the formation of a parliamentary government. The main focus of our work is on the importance of relative ideological positions in a legislative decision making game. We begin by analyzing the equilibrium outcomes of the game without any external party in uence, and then illustrate the usefulness of the model by considering the issue of party formation and how external party in uence can alter the outcomes.
Our approach is to model the legislative procedure as a non-cooperative game, building on the seminal bargaining approach of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) . 1 They considered a legislature whose members bargain over the distribution of a xed amount of a private good. They explicitly modeled the process by which legislators are recognized, make proposals and vote on proposals. Although Baron and Ferejohn considered a pure bargaining setting where the decision was entirely distributive, their non-cooperative approach and explicit speci cation of process allowed for predictions in situations where voting cycles exist (and the core is empty), and thus produced new insights relative to the existing spatial voting literature. The predictions of the Baron and Ferejohn model are simple, intuitive, and provide insight into the give-and-take present in a legislature and how decision making depends on the speci cs of procedure.
Of course, the main limitation of considering such a pure bargaining model is that it o ers little predictive power concerning the speci cs of coalition formation (other than con rming Riker's (1962) minimal winning coalition ideas), and o ers no insight into the relationship between legislative behavior and the ideological positions of the legislators. In order to provide insight into these issues we consider a legislature that must make a decision about both an ideological (or public good) dimension, over which legislators have single peaked preferences, and a purely distributive (or private good) dimension for which each legislator prefers to have a larger amount allocated to his or her constituency. We examine a random recognition rule where a legislator is randomly selected to make a proposal. The legislator may make a proposal over either dimension or both dimensions, and the proposal is then put to a vote. If the proposal fails to receive a majority of the vote, the process is repeated. If the proposal receives a majority of the vote and it involves both dimensions, then the game ends. If the proposal passes and only involves one dimension, then the process is repeated with the restriction that new proposals can only consider the remaining dimension.
In the context of this legislative game, we begin by showing that even though the ideological and distributive issues may be considered separately, the equilibria will involve a proposal and approval of both dimensions simultaneously. The ideological issues cannot be divorced from distributive issues because of the usefulness of the distributive dimension as an instrument for compromise. For example, in a legislature which is deciding on both the level of gun control and a division of government spending across states or provinces, it is useful to tie the consideration of these decisions together since bargaining over the distribution of spending can be used for compromise on the decisions concerning gun control. This becomes especially important when legislators' preferences vary in intensity over the ideological dimension, as then there are signi cant possibilities for compromise and tradeo . The outcome will generally not consist of a median decision on the level of gun control and separate bargaining over the distribution of spending.
Once this interaction between the dimensions is explored, we provide results regarding the structure of the equilibria of the legislative game. First, we show that every stationary equilibrium results in some level of randomization over approved decisions. Most importantly, in any equilibrium there is more than one ideological position which has a chance of being approved. The intuition for this result is fairly straightforward: given that only a majority is needed for approval, the choice of the proposal that a legislator makes will depend on that legislator's ideological position. The set of other legislators whose approval the proposer attempts to win depends on the legislator's ideological position, the intensity of other legislators' preferences and their willingness to trade o ideology for the distributive dimension. Given this heterogeneity, di erent proposers will nd di erent groups of legislators to be attractive as potential allies in forming a majority. This is in contrast with the homogeneous setting of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) .
Second, we examine the structure of the winning coalitions in a class of stationary equilibria. In particular, we show that every legislator has a chance of being excluded from the winning proposal, and of being included in the winning proposal. This means that no legislator is indi erent among all the outcomes which have a probability of approval in an equilibrium, and so there are some that they would support, and others that they would oppose (at least when they are pivotal). The surprising aspect of this is that there are some proposals which are necessarily made and approved which exclude the median legislator. Thus, there are proposals that are passed by a set of legislators whose ideological positions are not adjacent, and this is true regardless of the relative locations and strength of the ideological positions. Underlying this result is the fact that in order to get a legislator's approval, the proposer has to o er that legislator a package which matches the legislator's expectation of what will happen if the proposal is voted down (i.e., their continuation payo ). This has two related implications. First, as in Baron and Ferejohn (1989) , including a legislator in too many proposals strengthens their bargaining position and consequently makes it relatively expensive to obtain their vote. Second, on the ideological dimension the attractiveness of a proposal is measured relative to this expectation rather than on an absolute scale. For instance, a legislator with an ideological position at one extreme need only worry about how the proposal he or she makes compares to the expected continuation in order to win approval of a legislator with an opposite ideological position, and not how it compares to that legislator's own ideal point. This second intuition is a simple one, but a critical one for understanding our results.
Along these lines, the results exhibit some intuitive comparative statics. The set of proposals that are approved in an equilibrium generally exhibit some variation around their expectation (which is the relevant continuation expectation in a stationary equilibrium). So, there are winning proposals with ideological positions both to the left and right of the expected proposal. As distributive considerations are relatively less important to legislators and ideology is relatively more important, both the ability to compromise and the variation of the ideological dimension of the winning proposals decrease. In the limit, the winning proposals converge to the median position. At the other extreme, as distributive considerations are relatively more important to legislators, there is more room for compromise on ideology and correspondingly a larger variation along the ideological dimension of the winning proposals.
Finally, the structure and variation in the equilibria lead to a natural role for political parties. Given that legislators are not indi erent among the possible outcomes in an equilibrium, they may gain by forming a binding alliance with other legislators in the form of a political party. We discuss how this view relates to and di ers from related analyses of political parties in legislative settings. We consider examples where sharp predictions can be made concerning a stable political party, and examine the proposal that would emerge in the presence of the party. We also show that there are examples where there may be several political parties which could form and be stable (so that no members would choose to defect and ally themselves with others to form a new party), and examples where there are stable parties consisting of legislators at opposite extremes in the ideological spectrum.
Before proceeding to the model, let us discuss the relationship of this work to two other models which are closely related to the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) approach. Baron (1991) extends the Baron-Ferejohn model to the case of two dimensional decisions where agents have circular preferences over outcomes. This produces interesting insight into situations where there are three bargainers, which o ers some insight into government formation in a parliamentary system. However, the model turns out not to be tractable with larger numbers of players or with more general preferences. Thus, little can be said analytically about the general behavior of the equilibria and so is di cult to use to analyze coalition formation and legislative behavior. Calvert and Dietz (1996) note this di culty and take a di erent approach, still keeping with the original Baron-Ferejohn one dimensional pure bargaining model, but allowing legislators to care not only about their own share but also about the shares of others. Their model is tractable, as there is a natural tendency to form coalitions with other legislators about whose allocation you care most. This also allows for an analysis of party formation (which we will come back to discuss later). An important di erence between the Calvert and Dietz approach and the one we take here is in the motivation for forming coalitions. In their model this motivation comes from externalities in preferences. In our approach it comes from relative ideological positions and convictions. These di erent approaches o er complementary views of coalition and ultimately party formation and, as will become evident, di erent insights into coalition and party formation. We also take a di erent point of view on what a party is and how it works, treating it as an stable organization external to the game, rather than as a (non-stationary) equilibrium phenomenon of the game. We o er a detailed discussion of this view.
Let us mention one nal, but central, motivation for including an ideological dimension in a legislative model. Ultimately, it is important to marry a model of the internal workings of a legislature with models of elections of legislators, as well as the interactions of the legislature with other branches of government. As ideological considerations are critical to these relationships (especially the electoral process), understanding their role in the legislative setting is a crucial component of this larger program.
The Legislative Game Legislators
There are n legislators, where n 3 is an odd number.
Decisions
A decision is a vector (y; x 1 ; : : :; x n ) consisting of an ideological decision y and a distributive decision x 1 ; : : :x n . The set of feasible public decisions is 0; Y ] where Y 2 0; 1] and the set of private decisions are those such that x i 0 for each i and In the case where Y = 0, the model simpli es to that of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) , and so the X dimension captures decisions that are purely distributive with no ideological component. In the other extreme case, where X = 0, the model is one of a pure ideological decision as in a median voting model, and so the Y dimension captures decisions that are ideological or have the nature of a public good.
Preferences
Each legislator i has preferences over decisions that depend only on the public decision and his or her own component of the private decision. So preferences of legislator i are represented by a utility function u i : 0; 1] IR + ! 0; 1] that depends only on y and x i . The utility function, u i (y; x i ), is nonnegative, continuous, and strictly increasing in x i for every y 2 Y . Also, u i is single peaked in y for every x i . 2 We denote the peak of u i by b y i . Legislators evaluate randomizations over decisions through expected utility calculations.
The preference ranking of each legislator i over ideological decisions is separable from the distributive decision. More formally, for any (y; x 1 ; : : : ; x n ) and (y 0 ; x 0 1 ; : : : ; x 0 n ), u i (y; x i ) > u i (y 0 ; x i ) if and only if u i (y; x 0 i ) > u i (y 0 ; x 0 i ). This restriction actually provides for stronger results since we will show that, despite the separability of preferences, equilibrium behavior exhibits a strong interaction between the dimensions.
Without loss of generality, order legislators so that b y i b y j if i j. In any case where Y > 0, assume that b y 1 < b y n . Let b y med be the median of b y 1 ; : : : b y n . Legislators discount time at a rate where 0 < 1. So, their utility for reaching an agreement (y; x 1 ; : : : ; x N ) at time t is t u i (y; x i ). 
The Legislative Game
The legislative game 3 consists of a potentially in nite number of sessions. Time is indexed by sessions t 2 f1; 2; : : :g. At the beginning of each session a legislator is recognized at random to make a proposal. Legislator i is recognized with probability p i , where P i p i = 1 and the recognition probabilities are the same in each session. Next, the recognized legislator proposes a decision (y; x 1 ; : : :; x n ). (Shortly, we will consider a more general version where the legislator may choose to make a proposal in only one dimension.) Then, in a xed order 4 (the same in each session) the legislators are sequentially called on to vote`yes' or`no'. If a majority of legislators (at least n+1 2 ) vote`yes', then the game ends and the decision (y; x 1 ; : : :; x n ) is taken. Otherwise the game proceeds to the next session, where the process is repeated. 5 For the case that the game never ends, assign a default decision denoted (y 0 ; x 0 1 ; : : :; x 0 n ). For the case where < 1 this is irrelevant. For the case where = 1 it is conceivable that the default (viewed as a status quo) would matter, but we will prove that this is not the case.
Each legislator observes all the actions that precede any action he or she decides upon, so that the game is one of perfect information and the de nitions of strategies and subgame perfection are standard. 6 Although, our discussion always refers to a legislature, it should be clear that this game is also a useful model for committee interactions in a variety of di erent settings (for instance, a faculty committee), and also for the formation of a government. For more discussion of how such a model might t with the formation of a government, see 3 This game is consistent with the`closed rule' version of Baron-Ferejohn (1989) . 4 The order is not important to the results. A random or simultaneous order will support the same equilibria. One di erence, however, is that a simultaneous vote will result in additional equilibria where all legislators vote yes for an arbitrary proposal expecting that this is the case and thus having no chance of being pivotal, and similarly, can introduce equilibria where all legislators vote no for the same reason. Such degenerate equilibria are not possible in a subgame perfect equilibrium of an ordered (roll call) vote. 5 In some legislative settings there are restrictions on whether (or when) some issues can be reconsidered once they have been voted down. To the extent that di erent but related proposals can still be submitted, this game is still a good approximation. Furthermore, there are many decisions that legislative rules generally do allow to be reconsidered, even if previously voted down. Take, for example, the ideological dimension to be the overall size of a budget, and the distributive dimension to be the proportion of spending allocated to di erent constituencies. Finally, such restrictions rarely apply in other relevant settings such as government formation and most committees. 6 To de ne randomized actions for the proposer, consider all Borel probability measures over the space of feasible proposals. Baron (1989) and Baron and Ferejohn (1989) .
Stationary and Simple Equilibria
Generally, the set of equilibria can be large in a game such as the one described above, with some equilibria that involve very complex behavior. Indeed, a`folktheorem' type of result along the lines of Proposition 2 of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) holds here as well, where a large set of equilibrium outcomes can be supported. 7 However, the types of strategies needed to support arbitrary sorts of outcomes are quite complicated and are open to criticism on several grounds. Baron and Ferejohn argue for limiting attention to equilibria involving stationary strategies, based on focalness of such equilibria and on the nite horizons of individual legislators. Rather than repeat those arguments here, we refer the interested reader to their discussion. 8 A strategy is stationary if each legislator's continuation strategy is the same at the beginning of any session, regardless of history. An equilibrium is stationary if it is a subgame perfect equilibrium and each legislator's strategy is stationary. 9 In some situations strategies turn out to satisfy further restrictions in terms of the number of proposals that a legislator randomizes over when called upon. A legislator's proposal must win the approval at least n?1 2 other legislators to become an equilibrium Note that a simple equilibrium does not require that the sets of legislators who approve two di erent proposals by i be distinct, as i may make proposals that are approved by supermajorities. 7 Here there are restrictions on the ideological outcomes that can be supported as depending on the size of (or relative preference for) X. But with large enough X and any outcome can be supported in subgame perfect equilibrium. 8 See also Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) for further discussion in a game theoretic bargaining context. 9 Of course non-stationary deviations are allowed when applying the de nition of equilibrium. The above benchmark shows that in the purely ideological case, any stationary equilibrium outcome 1011 is close to the median legislator's ideological ideal point. The intuition is that a proposal too far away from the median legislator's ideal point should not win approval, given that the median and legislators to the other side can wait and do better. A detailed proof is o ered in the appendix.
The other extreme benchmark is the purely private case.
Benchmark 2 (Baron and Ferejohn (1989) ). If Y = 0, there are equal probabilities of recognition, and u i (0; x i ) = x i for all i, then in any stationary equilibrium each legislator has an expected distributive allocation of X n . Furthermore, there exists a simple equilibrium in which any recognized legislator proposes a share X(1 ? n?1 2n ) for him or herself, and X n to each of a randomly selected n?1 2 other legislators, and this is approved by those randomly selected legislators.
This second benchmark illustrates the pure bargaining aspect: legislators are o ered something which makes them indi erent between voting yes now and waiting for the continuation, and the proposer keeps the excess. The result extends to situations where the probabilities of recognition are not quite equal (with some adjustments necessary in the probabilities of who to propose to). This follows from the balancing that goes on in the purely distributive game: a legislator always wants to make an o er to the cheapest (in terms of expectations) other legislators. This keeps any single legislator from having too high an expectation since in that case other proposers would not want to o er that legislator anything. Clearly, if a single legislator has an overwhelming probability of being recognized then this reasoning breaks down.
Agenda Setting with both Ideological and Distributive Decisions
We now move to the general case of both ideological and distributive decisions. First, we show that it is without loss of generality that we restrict the game to one where proposals are made over both ideological and distributive decisions simultaneously. That is, we show that in a game where the proposer has a choice of whether to propose on just one dimension at a time or on both simultaneously, he or she chooses to propose on both dimensions simultaneously (except in certain degenerate situations where the outcome is in any case equivalent).
A More General Legislative Game
Consider the following legislative game. The structure of the game is the same as the one described previously, except that the proposer may choose either to propose a decision in both dimensions, or to propose a decision in just one of the dimensions. In the case where a proposal is made and approved which involves just one dimension, then that decision is xed and the game is continued with a new random recognition of proposer to decide on the remaining dimension. The de nition of stationary strategy is extended so that an agent's strategy can depend on the previously approved proposal of one dimension if there is one.
Proposition 1 Consider any stationary equilibrium of the general legislative game with concave utility functions. If < 1, then the game ends in the rst session with an approved proposal that involves both dimensions. If = 1, then for any stationary equilibrium there exists a stationary equilibrium with exactly the same probability distribution over eventually approved decisions which ends in the rst session. Moreover, if = 1 then with probability 1 some proposal is approved in the rst session, and any proposal which is approved and does not involve both dimensions has the distributive dimension proposed and approved in the rst session and then the median proposal approved in some subsequent session.
Note that the last case is non-generic as requires special con gurations of preferences. Generally, there is compromise to be made and we should expect the decisions to be taken together. This is detailed in Proposition 5.
For the case of < 1, the fact that a decision on both dimensions is approved in the rst period is not surprising, as there is a cost to waiting. The more interesting case is when = 1. Once a proposer has the oor it is in his or her interest to propose a distributive decision that will be approved, as otherwise they may be excluded in what follows. The fact that they will choose also to propose an ideological decision is where the importance of compromise comes in. If only the distributive decision is made and cannot be changed, then in what follows Benchmark 1 will apply and we should expect the median ideological decision to be taken. Thus, any compromise that is to be made must be made simultaneously with the distributive decision.
Given the equivalence between the outcomes of the two games established by Proposition 1, 12 for the remainder of the paper we restrict our attention to the game where legislators propose on both dimensions simultaneously.
Winning Proposals and Coalitions
We now provide a sequence of results which describe properties of simple and/or stationary equilibria.
The proposition below establishes the existence of simple equilibria. This is important since otherwise the analysis which follows could be vacuous. It is also interesting in that it demonstrates that despite the potential complexity of the game, there always exists a set of simple strategies that legislators can follow that are optimal with respect to each other. Proposition 2 If u i is concave for each i, then there exists a simple equilibrium. Moreover, if each u i is strictly concave then all stationary equilibria are simple.
Standard game theoretic results concerning the existence of equilibrium do not apply here given the continuum of actions and the stochastic nature of the game, 13 and moreover because we are establishing existence of simple equilibrium. Thus we o er a direct proof of Proposition 2 in the appendix. 14 We remark that the proof of Proposition 2 does not rely on the separability of preferences.
Next we establish some basic characteristics of the equilibria.
Proposition 3 In any stationary equilibrium:
any approved decision distributes X among an exact majority, if utility functions are concave, then the legislative game ends in the rst session if < 1, and the same is true for = 1 if utility functions are strictly concave, if the utility functions are concave, then the equilibrium is independent of the default decision (even if = 1).
The fact that X is distributed among an exact majority rea rms the logic of Riker (1962) and Baron and Ferejohn (1989) . 15 Note that this depends on the closed rule nature of the legislative game, and would not necessarily hold in an open rule version where amendments can be proposed. Such ideas are explored in Baron and Ferejohn (1989) and not reconsidered here.
The fact that the legislative game ends in the rst session is fairly clear for the case that < 1, but for the case of = 1 the argument is a bit more subtle as one can imagine a legislator being indi erent between the approved proposals and thus willing to make a realistic proposal with probability less than 1, with the expectation that sooner or later it will be made and approved. The key to the proof comes from the next two propositions which establish a certain heterogeneity in equilibrium proposals and show that any proposer has a chance of being excluded from some proposal. This last fact breaks indi erence so that a recognized legislator strictly prefers to propose a decision that will be approved. Finally, the fact that the equilibrium is independent of the default decision when = 1 is again a consequence of the reasoning presented below. Each legislator will have some chance of being excluded from a winning proposal, and this induces a form of impatience when they have a chance to propose. This induced impatience makes the default outcome irrelevant.
Legislators have well-de ned ex ante expected utilities for a given strategy pro le. Given the stationarity, at any point in the legislative game these expected utilities also represent the expectated utility of the continuation, conditional on the current proposal not being approved. We generally denote these by v i . The following de nitions identify how a legislator ranks a proposal relative to the continuation.
A proposal (y; x 1 ; : : :x n ) excludes legislator i (relative to v i ) if u i (y; x i ) < v i : 15 In fact, this idea appears in von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944).
A proposal (y; x 1 ; : : :x n ) includes legislator i (relative to v i ) if u i (y; x i ) v i :
Note that the de nition of`exclude' and`include' is made relative to the legislator's preferences and not their voting behavior. It is possible in equilibrium for a legislator to vote`yes' on a proposal when they prefer the continuation, provided they are in a situation where they are certain that the proposal will be approved regardless of their vote. That is, if a proposal has received or will receive a majority independent of a given legislator's vote, then he or she will be indi erent between voting`yes' or`no.' The idea behind the de nitions of`exclusion' or`inclusion' is that they tell us how a legislator would vote if the legislator was pivotal.
Proposition 4 Suppose that legislators' utility functions are concave. There exists < 1 such that for all in any simple equilibrium and for every legislator i there is a positive probability that a proposal is made and approved which excludes i. Furthermore, if = 1 then this is true for every stationary equilibrium.
One implication of the above proposition is that the median is excluded from some proposal. This means that in any simple equilibrium there is a positive probability that a proposal wins the approval of (and includes the members of) a disjoint coalition.
The proposition is not true for all values of , since if is su ciently low then legislators are so impatient that any decision today is preferred to their ideal decision tomorrow. Thus, if legislators are su ciently impatient, then they can all be included in a decision simply by virtue of their impatience.
In Proposition 4, it is not clear that the exclusion of a legislator involves anything more than the distributive dimension, which would simply follow the logic of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) . In fact there are interesting tradeo s occurring in the ideological dimension as well. The following proposition makes this point clear.
In what follows, let us restrict attention to quasi-linear utility functions. A legislator's preferences are said to be quasi-linear if there exists a single peaked u i : 0; 1] ! 0; 1] such that u i (y; x i ) = u i (y)+x i . The quasi-linear preferences permit a more transparent presentation of the following proposition. They are not necessary, but without this assumption the extension of the following de nition is more complicated. We say that preferences admit local compromise if there exists some exact majority C N such that b y med is not a local maximum of P i2C u i (y). The above condition is a very weak one. It states that there exists some majority coalition that could improve its overall utility by moving the ideological decision slightly away from the median decision. In situations where the u i 's are concave, this is essentially a generic property, as it is only in rare cases that all majority coalitions (in particular those not including the median) have a local maximum at b y med .
Proposition 5 Suppose that there are equal probabilities of recognition, and legislators' preferences are quasi-linear and admit local compromise. Then in any stationary equilibrium there is more than one y (and thus more than one proposal) that has positive probability of being an equilibrium decision.
Proposition 5 tells us that the possibility of joint consideration of the two dimensions impacts the outcome on each dimension. Note that this is true even though agents have additively separable preferences, and so even when the dimensions are completely independent. Thus, this distinguishes our results from those in the spatial model where agents have circular or elliptical preferences (as, for instance, in Enelow and Hinich (1984) ). There the cardinal impact of changes in one dimension depends on the choice in the other dimension, and so there is some built-in interaction between dimensions. In particular, how much a legislator cares about one dimension versus another can depend on the location. 17 Proposition 5 does not indicate what equilibrium implications are for the distributive dimension. As illustrated in the examples that follow, the distribution may be quite asymmetric depending on the relative ideological intensities of the legislators.
Comparative Statics
So far we have established a number of general properties of simple (and in many cases stationary) equilibria, which under the assumption of concave utility functions are loosely summarized as follows.
Simple equilibria always exist, and in such an equilibrium: Both dimensions will be considered together and a decision will be approved in the rst session.
Each legislator is excluded from some decision that has a chance of being approved.
Generically there are at least two di erent ideological decisions that have a chance of being approved. In order to take our understanding further, we now examine some comparative statics. First, we develop a result that allows one to examine limiting behavior, and to draw conclusions from the Benchmarks we presented earlier. Second, we consider a speci c parametric example of the model with three legislators, and examine changes in the equilibrium as the intensity of ideological preferences and locations of ideal points vary.
The following lemma shows that the set of simple equilibria are well behaved as one varies the set of parameters. The lemma is also an integral part of the proof of Propositions 2 and 4. This is a fairly standard result that shows the upper-hemicontinuity of the equilibrium correspondence, which is easily obtained here due to stationarity. 18 Lemma 1 Let ( k ; Y k ; X k ; u k 1 ; : : : ; u k n ) ! ( ; Y ; X; u 1 ; : : :; u n ), be a converging sequence of discount factors, ideological intervals, distributive intervals, and preference pro les, with corresponding simple equilibria`k. 19 Choose any convergent subsequence of the equilibria and let its limit be`. 20 Then`is a simple equilibrium of the legislative game for ( ; Y ; X; u 1 ; : : : ; u n ).
As well as establishing upper-hemicontinuity of the simple equilibrium correspondence, the lemma has important implications for limiting comparative statics. For example, Benchmarks 1 and 2 can be used to understand what happens when X becomes relatively large or small compared to Y . Consider the case where = 1. As the size of X goes to zero, the simple equilibria are close to ones where all proposals involve b y med , as in Benchmark 1. As the size of Y goes to zero, the simple equilibria are close to pure bargaining ones analyzed by Baron and Ferejohn (1989) , as in Benchmark 2.
To gain a better understanding for the intermediate cases, where both X and Y play a role and there is a possibility of compromise, let us consider a few examples. 18 Banks and Duggan (1998) independently provide a similar lemma in a general bargaining context. 19 Measure distance between u i and e u i by sup y;xi2 0;1] I R+ ju i (y; x i ) ? e u i (y; x i )j, and assume that (u n 1 ; : : :; u n N ) are admissible. Simple equilibrium strategies may be set in a nite dimensional Euclidean space, as outlined in the appendix. 20 Since there may be multiple simple equilibria, the sequence may not converge. However, any cluster point of the sequence will be a simple equilibrium. the distance of y from b y i in a linear fashion. Say that i proposes to j if the proposal by i includes j and excludes the remaining legislator. Let y ij ; x ij denote the decision proposed by i when proposing to j, and a ij denote the probability that i proposes to j.
For the case where the b i 's are distinct, there is a unique stationary (and thus simple) equilibrium which is described in the appendix. 21 Note that the equilibrium exhibits the properties that each legislator is excluded from some decision and that several ideological decisions are possible. Also, the decisions are e cient for the two legislators in question in that X goes to the legislator who cares less about ideology and Y lies between the two legislators' peaks.
There are some other interesting things to note. First, the ideological decisions are all described relative to b y med (and for instance, shifting y 1 or y 3 while preserving the ordering of ideal points actually has no e ect for small enough X as in the footnote below). Keeping all else constant, if we shift b y med then the equilibrium shifts completely as is, without changes in the relative positions of each decision. This illustrates an anchoring e ect of the median benchmark. In the absence of any X (or as we can see by letting X ! 0 in the equilibrium), the decision would be the median b y med . Thus all compromise occurs relative to that anchoring position, regardless of whether it is closer to the left or the right.
Second, the range of the ideological decisions (y ij 's) increases as X increases. Larger X permits greater tradeo and thus results in a larger dispersion of ideological choices. In the extreme, as X becomes very large, proposed y's would always be either b y 2 (if 1 and 2 are included) or b y 3 (otherwise), depending on the coalition. One interpretation is that legislators are essentially buying votes. If a legislator with a higher b i is proposing, then she can use increased the larger X to buy a larger movement in the ideological decision. Similarly, a proposer with a lower b i can extract more of the private good through a concession in ideology.
Third, there is a 1/3 chance that the decision is made by the coalition comprising legislators 1 and 3, who are not ideologically adjacent. This particular coalition has a nice intuition: it is the legislator with the most intense ideological preferences proposing to the legislator with the least intense ideological preferences, who thus o ers the best compromise even though their ideological positions are the most extreme. An important thing to note here is that it is the expected continuation proposals that anchor the bargaining. From 3's perspective, both legislators 1 and 2 are to the left of where 3 would like the outcome to be, and 3 will end up o ering the full X to whomever he proposes to in order to get the most favorable y position. 23 Fourth, the median's expected utility v 2 = ? X 2 . Thus, the median's expected utility is decreasing in the size of the pie! This is due to the increasing ability of 1 and 3 to compromise, and thus their increasing importance in the bargaining process which makes things worse for the median.
Some aspects of the above equilibrium generalize while others do not. The full description of all cases is outlined in the appendix. In each case where b 1 < b 2 < b 3 , 1 always proposes to 2. As 1 will always get the full X in such a proposal, 2 has less intense ideological preferences and o ers a better y position for 1. More generally, however, 2 and sometimes 3 may mix over who they propose to. For 2 it is a choice of being the relatively less ideological legislator in a proposal to 3, or the relatively more ideological legislator in a proposal to 1 -and in many cases in equilibrium 2 can be indi erent. Also, as mentioned above, 3 would like to propose to the cheaper of the two other legislators. It turns out that as b 2 increases relative to b 1 , then 3 strictly 23 Here 3 would get exactly same outcome by proposing to 2 instead of 1, given the current expectations. However, if 3 proposed to 2 then 2's expectations would be higher and 3 would have to move y closer to b y med to get 2's approval. So the only equilibrium has 3 proposing to 1. prefers to propose to 1. However, as b 2 decreases, then 3 becomes indi erent and mixes in equilibrium.
Let us examine other cases to get a feel for the kinds of behavior that are possible in equilibrium. Here, 2 mixes between proposing to 3 and proposing to 1. Note that 2's proposal to 1 involves a split of the X. This happens because 2 is able to set y = b y med and so cannot improve on this dimension. Note also that compared to equilibrium 1, having more intense ideological preferences has helped agent 2: the proposals are all better for 2 than the corresponding proposals in Example 1. That is, regardless of whether 2 has the preferences of Example 1 or Example 2, she prefers the outcome in Example 2 to that in Example 1. The intuition for this is that the ideological dimension has become more important and the possibility for compromise on the ideological dimension has diminished, moving the relative position of the y proposals closer to the median. The distribution of the X dimension is determined by the ordering of the ideological intensities, but not their precise values. This turns out to be exactly the same as Example 3, illustrating that it is only the relative intensity of 1 and 2's ideological preference that matters in equilibrium. This is true since 3 will never get any X in the proposals (given the intensity of his preferences) and so it is only the relative willingness to compromise of the other legislators that matters. 2 . Note that this example is similar to Example 3 except that the intensity of legislators 1 and 2's preferences are reversed. Correspondingly the identity of which of these two mixes is reversed.
Political Parties
In the above examples, if two legislators were to get together before the legislative game and bind themselves to cooperate with each other, then they could strictly improve over what they expect in the equilibrium. Thus, the legislative game o ers an explicit reason for legislators to try to form such binding agreements. More generally, there exists the possibility of Pareto improvements as the outcome of the legislative game is not Pareto e cient. This is formalized in Proposition 6 which appears in the next section. Viewing political parties as institutions capable of facilitating such agreements, and most importantly enforcing them, this aspect of the game provides an incentive for the creation of political parties. 24 This motivation for party formation has been examined in a legislative bargaining context by Baron (1989 and 1991) . 25 Let us explore what insight our model has to o er to the speci cs of party formation. Krehbiel (1993) provides an important set of issues to be addressed in a model of party formation. His central point is that similarities in preferences or other motivating factors may naturally result in voting patterns that appear consistent with party behavior, independent of the party's existence. Thus, it is important to distinguish between \party-like" behavior and signi cant changes in behavior due to parties. The idea being that one might observe something which appears to be party behavior, but really matches the natural underlying equilibrium behavior of the individuals in any case. In such a situation, the fact that there exists something labelled a \party" is a natural result of the incentives of individuals to vote similarly, and not something that externally a ects the outcome.
Calvert and Dietz (1996) point out that while the Baron (1991) model is in principle well suited for an analysis of party and party-like behavior, it is close to intractable. Instead, Calvert and Dietz propose a variation on the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) model that allows legislators to have preferences over the distributive allocations going to others as well as themselves. This turns out to be more tractable and in particular, Calvert and Dietz demonstrate a natural tendency for legislators who care about each other's allocations to vote and propose closely together. Thus, they provide a benchmark of party-like behavior, consistent with Krehbiel's thesis: outcomes appear consistent with a party organization even though there are no binding forces. Calvert and Dietz (1996) do not model parties, and thus do not contrast party behavior with party-like behavior, but they outline a method for doing so in future research. Their suggestion is to examine non-stationary equilibria in the context of 24 There is another role that political parties might serve which is simply to coordinate behavior in the face of multiple equilibria. We do not pursue this here. 25 The underlying ideas have a rich history and are in part the motivation for the early literature on cooperative game theory which was tied to what cooperating players could earn in non-cooperative games, again dating to von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). The political science literature considers a variety of possible motivations for party formation. Some representative references are the classics by Duverger (1954) and Riker (1962) , and recent analyses of the role of parties in legislative contexts by Cox and McCubbins (1993) , Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991) , and Baron and Diermeier (1997) . Most relevant for our analysis are papers by Krehbiel (1993) and Calvert and Dietz (1996) . their game, and use that as the model of a party organization. To the contrary, we argue that this would not be a model of party behavior, but again a model of party-like behavior. A non-stationary equilibrium, just like a stationary equilibrium, is entirely self-enforcing. There is no outside force necessary to induce players to follow the prescribed behavior. If one believes that non-stationary equilibria are plausible, then no party is needed -simply knowledge of the equilibrium strategies themselves. Moreover, the non-stationary behavior needed to establish folk-theorem like results is often recursive. Thus, we argue against the idea that non-stationary equilibrium should be interpreted as party behavior, and stationary equilibrium play should be interpreted as party-like behavior.
Instead, our approach to modeling the party as an in uence on the legislative game is to treat the party as an organization that is external to the game and through rewards and punishments can enforce behavior that would otherwise not be observed in the game. Thus, we stick with stationary equilibrium as the benchmark for the behavior in the game in the absence of any external force, and compare it to a situation where an external force is present. As an example, by controlling things such as committee appointments and campaign funding (or intangibles like brand-recognition and reputation as suggested in Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991)) a political party can serve as a device that binds legislators to following certain strategies which they would otherwise choose not to. This can in turn improve their legislative performance.
One might reply to this view by saying that if one enlarges the scope of the model to be a much larger game including committee formation, campaigning, and elections, etc., then the party is again simply an equilibrium phenomenon and does not di er from what players naturally would like to do. With this we would have to agree. However, this is a version of Krehbiel's point taken ad absurdum. It is useful to distinguish the behavior of political players inside institutions such as a legislature or an election where there are well de ned rules which lend naturally to equilibrium modeling techniques, from the their behavior in general political arena. We argue that viewing a political party as an organization that operates in the general political arena, and has an ability to in uence play inside a legislative body, is a reasonable and productive modeling choice.
Let us now reexamine the examples in the last section in the context of party formation.
A party is modeled as a binding agreement among its members to act as one player in the legislative game. That is, they can commit each to follow the same single action when recognized, and to approve each other's proposals. We are thus assuming binding commitment on the part of the legislators who have formed a party. This commitment is not modeled here, but would require some repeated interaction in a context which allows for rewards and punishments (such as appointments, fundraising, etc.) which lie outside of the scope of the legislative game we analyze.
The combination of multiple legislators into one party generally poses di cult questions about how to model the decision of the party regarding how to act in the legislative game. As a rst step in this direction, restricting our attention to the setting of the examples in the last section, however, considerably simpli es things and results in natural ways to model party behavior.
Consider two legislators who are forming a party. The party will generate bene ts for them relative to the legislative game without any parties. They must split these bene ts in some way. For instance, they could choose a platform that would give all the bene ts to the rst legislator and leave the second indi erent between being in the party or playing the straight legislative game. Similarly, they could reverse this, or they could end up somewhere in between. How these relative bene ts are split implicitly determines the behavior of the party (and vice versa). So let us analyze this splitting.
The feasible pairs of gains in utility relative to the disagreement outcome (of the game without any parties) form a nice closed and convex set, as in the classical bargaining analysis of Nash. We use the Nash bargaining solution as a prediction for the surplus split among the party members. 26 In the case where the possible Pareto optimal utility combinations for the party form a linear frontier, this ends up giving each of the two party members half of their maximal (potential) surplus relative to the threat point of no party.
More formally, for any two of the three legislators, i; j let u NB i (fi; jg); u NB j (fi; jg) Now, given an idea of how each given party will act, and what utilities it will generate for its members, we can step back and ask which parties are most likely to 26 We do not model the explicit bargaining that goes on within a party. In the case where the frontier is linear, most extensive form bargaining procedures and bargaining solutions in any case coincide (as form. In particular, we can look for a (core) stable party structure such that neither legislator in the resulting party would rather be in another party.
Stable Parties
A party fi; jg is stable if u NB i (fi; jg) u NB i (fi; kg) and u NB j (fi; jg) u NB j (fj; kg).
The de nition above applies only to the case of 3 legislators. Below, we discuss the extension to larger numbers of legislators.
Let us illustrate this approach in some detail by looking back at the examples of the previous section. The following observation is helpful in mapping out the range of possible utility combinations that a party can generate for its members, and holds more generally.
Observation 1: If in the simple equilibrium of the game without parties i makes a proposal to j, then the maximum (potential) surplus that i can get from a party with j subject to j weakly preferring the party to the equilibrium outcome, is the same as the surplus that i gets from this proposal over the expected continutation.
Observation 1 is based on the fact that in an equilibrium, when a legislator gets to propose, he will choose a proposal that maximizes his surplus, subject to making another legislator indi erent between voting yes or no. This is the most that the legislator could get from a party, subject to both members being above the disagreement point and helps to de ne the possibility set for the party.
Let us now return to analyzing the example with Observation 1 in hand. We rst analyze the potential party of legislators 2 and 3.
Given Observation 1, to identify the maximum potential surplus that could go to legislator 2, we can examine the utility from the proposal y 23 ; x 23 compared to the expected equilibrium continuation. Here u 2 (y 23 ; x 23 ) = X 1 2 , so u 2 ? v 2 = X. So if the party acted purely in legislator 2's interest, subject to legislator 3 being as well o as without the party, then it would improve legislator 2's payo by X.
We cannot apply observation 1 to nd out the most that party f2; 3g could do for legislator 3 (subject to being above disagreement for legislator 2), since 3 does not o er to legislator 2 in equilibrium. Thus we need to directly calculate the best proposal for 3 subject to u 2 v 2 . In this case, a simple calculation shows that the best such proposal is y = b y med + X 2 , x = (0; X; 0). 28 This results in u 3 = ?6+6b y med +3X. So u 3 ?v 3 = 2X. The range of possible utility combinations that the party f2; 3g can generate relative to the disagreement point of the stationary equilibrium without parties is pictured in Figure 1 . Applying, the Nash bargaining solution to this set results in a surplus of X 2 going to legislator 2, and X to legislator 3. This corresponds to having the party f2; 3g make the proposal 29 Finally, let us analyze the potential of party f1; 2g. The calculation of the frontier is more complicated in this case. First, using Observation 1, we can calculate the maximal potential surplus for legislator 1, which is 2 3 X, obtained when y = y 12 , x = x 12 .
For player 2, the best that the party could do subject to 1 being as well o as in disagreement is to propose, y = b y med , x = (X 1 2 ; X 1 2 ; 0), which results in a maximal potential surplus for legislator 2 of X. However, in this case the possibility frontier is not linear. The frontier of utility combinations that the party f1; 2g can generate is found by moving e ciently between y = y 12 = b y med ? 1 6 X, x = x 12 = (X; 0; 0) and y = b y med , x = ( 1 2 X; 1 2 X; 0). There is a kink at the point b y med , (X; 0; 0), as player 3 moving y down from that point results in incremental losses to u 2 at the rate b 3 = 3, 28 Note that in order to gure out the bargaining problem for the two legislators, we cannot simply look at the best proposal for them and see how they split the gains relative to the non-party case. The reason is that the set proposals for the two legislators that correspond to the Pareto frontier involve variations not only in allocations of X, but in some cases where all of X is already allocated to a single legislator, the proposals also involve changes y. 29 It is also possible to let the party randomize, with no changes in expected action or utility.
while moving x 2 up from that point increases u 2 only at a rate of 1. This is pictured in Figure 2 . Nash bargaining in this case leads to the surplus combination of 1 2 X to legislator 1, and 1 2 X to legislator 2, which corresponds to the proposal b y med , (X; 0; 0). 30 From these calculations, it follows that 1 strictly prefers party f1; 2g to f1; 3g, 2 is indi erent between parties f1; 2g and f2; 3g, and 3 is indi erent between parties f1; 3g and f2; 3g.
Relative to these preferences there are two stable parties: f1; 2g and f2; 3g. The party f1; 3g is not stable as legislator 1 would prefer to change and form party f1; 2g.
Note that party behavior is distinguished from the non-party (or party-like) equilibrium behavior in terms of both actions and resulting utilities.
Next, let us reexamine Example 2 to see that the stable party structure depends on the particulars of the situation.
Example 2 Revisited:
Similar calculations as those described above, show that 1 strictly prefers party f1; 2g to f1; 3g, 2 strictly prefers party f1; 2g to f2; 3g, and 3 is strictly prefers party f1; 3g to f2; 3g. Relative to these preferences there is a unique stable party: f1; 2g.
Both legislators 2 and 3 have relatively strong ideological positions and would rather form a party with legislator 1 than with each other. Legislator 1 gets more out of forming a party with legislator 2, so that is the unique party outcome.
Example 5 Revisited:
Calculations for this example show that 1 is indi erent between parties f1; 2g and f1; 3g, 2 strictly prefers party f2; 3g to f1; 2g, and 3 is indi erent between parties f1; 3g and f2; 3g, Relative to these preferences both f1; 3g and f2; 3g are possible stable party structures.
Most importantly, this example points out that it is possible for a party such as f1; 3g, whose members have disjoint ideological positions to be stable. Moreover, this is not simply in a situation where all parties are stable as party f1; 2g is not stable. Note, however, that the proposal that party f1; 3g would approve would be y = b y med + 1 2 X, x = (X; 0; 0), which di ers from the simple equilibrium play in the absence of a party, but is not an extreme position. To understand this, note that the reservation utilities depend on the expected outcome of the legislative game without parties. It is within that constraint that legislators search for others with whom gains are greatest (or compromise is cheapest). Generally, although parties have an impact and change predicted behavior relative to an equilibrium without parties, that change is constrained by the comparisons to the disagreement simple equilibrium outcome implicit in the formation of the party platform.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have proposed a model of legislative bargaining that extends the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) model to include ideological considerations in a natural and tractable way. These considerations are essential to understanding legislative decision making, as well as the workings of a legislature in a broader political context. With this in mind, we have provided a series of results characterizing equilibrium behavior.
We have also used the model for a simple examination of the role and formation of political parties. As seen in the examples in the last section, sharp predictions concerning the constituency and position of stable political parties can be made in such a model, and these depend on the particular ideological positions and intensities of the legislators. This suggests that the methodology we have outlined here will be useful in further analysis of the roles of political parties in legislative contexts.
We make a few important observations in this regard. The model we have presented always o ers a strict incentive for party formation for any n, when utility functions are strictly concave. This follows from Propositions 4. Legislators know that without any parties there is a positive probability that they will be excluded from the \winning" legislative coalition, while by coordinating actions they can guarantee that they are all included. This is formally stated as follows. The implication of the above proposition is that the legislative game always results in an ex ante Pareto ine cient outcome, and so there is always room for a party to move in and o er its members a Pareto improvement by coordinating their actions. The proposition shows that the grand coalition could o er a Pareto improvement, and so, for high a enough discount factor, a majority party can o er its members an improvement relative to the non-party game. This proposition thus demonstrates that legislators have strict incentives to form parties in the context of our legislative game.
With regards to further exploration of the formation of parties two fundamental issues present themselves. First, one has to extend the de nitions of stable party structure to situations with more than three legislators. In the previous section we considered only the case of = 1 and n = 3, and so issues of how other parties or legislators act in a game with a given party structure were irrelevant, as a party could always enforce any decision. More generally, the disagreement points relative to which any given party decides upon its strategy may be endogenous. These disagreement points will depend on the party structure and strategies of other legislators, which in turn depend on their anticipated disagreement point. Second, after one has predictions for the outcome of a game given arbitrary party structures, conditions will need to be identi ed that guarantee the existence of a stable party structure, as core stable partitions need not exist generally, even though they did in the simple examples that we considered in the previous section.
Finally, we have focussed our attention on a speci c game, derived from the closed rule of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) where a proposal is immediately voted upon, and legislators are randomly recognized. As this is a highly stylized game, it is important to develop similar understandings for other game forms, or classes of games, to see whether results that come from the model we have examined here turn out to extend to other game forms.
The proofs below do not appear in the same order as the results. This economizes on proof, as some results that appear later in the paper can be used in the proofs of ones that appeared earlier.
For simple equilibria (or strategies), we keep track of the strategy of proposals that i makes by a vector (d iC ; iC ) C , where d iC is a proposal that i makes and is approved by legislators in C (and perhaps others as well) and iC is the probability that this given the continuity of u i (and v i ) it is clear that`is still an equilibrium in the rst session given that agents expect`to be the continuation, since`k is an equilibrium for each k. For the case where = 1 we also need to check that there is no agent who can deviate in an in nite number of sessions and be made better o . We can follow the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 4 for = 1 (see below 31 ) to show that for any i there is a positive probability that some proposal is made and approved which excludes i, and so given the stationarity of strategies, the game will end in nite time regardless of i's actions.
Proof of Benchmark 1: The rst part of the proposition is straightforward.
Consider the second part. Note that in a stationary equilibrium, either with probability 1 the game never terminates, or else with probability 1 the game terminates at some nite date. To see this let a be the probability that the game terminates in the rst session. If a = 0, then given stationarity the game never terminates. If a > 0, then given stationarity the probability that the game lasts at least t sessions is (1?a) t which converges to 0 as t becomes large.
Consider the possibility that in equilibrium no proposal is ever approved and the default y 0 is the outcome with probability 1. If y 0 = b y med , then the conclusion of the proposition is true. If y 0 < b y med (the case y 0 > b y med is analogous), then when the median legislator is recognized and proposes b y med it will be approved by a majority 31 Note that although Lemma 1 is invoked in the proof of Proposition 4, it is only invoked in the case where < 1.
(given the continuation expectation of y 0 which must be worse for everyone to the right of (and including) the median). Thus, the median should deviate and propose b y med which is a contradiction.
Next, consider the possibility that some proposal is made and approved with positive probability. Let y min be the lowest y and y max be the highest y which is approved with positive probability in equilibrium. 32 First, let us examine the case where y min 6 = y max . Note that y 1 y min (and similarly y max y n ), since otherwise y 1 could be proposed in place of y min and strictly preferred by all, which contradicts the fact that y min is part of an equilibrium. Given y med note that legislators whose peaks are at least as large as y max must have u j (y max ) > v j and so for small it follows that u j ( b y med + (1 ? )y max ) > v j . Others who were voting`yes' for y max but have lower peaks below y max are made better o by the change and will still vote`yes'.) This is a contradiction, and so the supposition was wrong. Thus, say y max = b y med . It then follows that y min should never be approved, since a majority (the median and above) prefer y max = b y med to y min < b y med . Thus, there cannot be an equilibrium such that y min 6 = y max . Next, let us examine the case where y min = y max . If y min 6 = b y med , then when the 32 These are well de ned. There are at most two proposals that a player nds indi erent to the continuation, and then an interval over which they strictly prefer the proposal to the continuation, and (at most) two intervals over which they strictly prefer the continuation to the proposal. Thus, there are a nite set of intervals of proposals that will win the approval of a majority. An approved proposal must maximize the expected utility of the proposer subject to being approved and there are a nite number of solutions to this. Suppose that i med (the other case is analagous). Consider C such that j 2 C have u j (d + ) v j : For small the proposal (y + ? ; x 1 ; : : :; x n ) would be approved by all j 2 C (the only j to worry about are those with u j (d + ) = v j , but this implies that also u j (d ? ) = v j and so y ? < b y j < y + ). This is a contradiction. So consider the other case where y = b y i and x i = X for every approved proposal. Any other agent could make proposal (b y i ; X n ; : : : ; X n ) which would be approved by a majority and strictly improving for that majority, which is a contradiction. Thus our original supposition was wrong.
The existence of < 1 with the claimed properties now follows from Lemma 1.
Proof of Proposition 2: First, consider the case where < 1.
We provide an outline of the proof. We rst represent the legislators' proposal strategies (which have nite support) by a vector`listing probabilities and proposals for each legislator. Second, we de ne the set of proposals a legislator i might make which would be approved by a majority given that they expect`to describe the continuation strategies (and they expect this to be approved). We denote this set by A ?i (`) and show that it is a continuous correspondence which is nonempty and compact valued. We then de ne another correspondence mapping`into best responses for each legislator -where each legislator chooses proposals from A ?i (`) to maximize u i . So, given`we obtain a set of best proposals that i can make and have approved given the expected continuation`. This correspondence is denoted A i (`) and is upper-hemicontinous and nonempty, compact and convex valued and thus has a xed point. We then verify that this xed point represents the proposals each legislator makes which together with proper approval strategies form the equilibrium.
As it may be that i randomizes over the C's that he or she proposes to, we keep track of the strategy of proposals that i makes by a vector (d iC ; iC ) C , where d iC is a proposal that i makes and is approved by legislators in C (and perhaps others as well), iC is the probability that this proposal made and It follows that for each k we can nd n k such that u j (d k ) > v j (`n) for all j 2 C and constitute a stationary equilibrium, as given < 1 and the stationarity we need only to check that no agent wants to deviate in the rst session. 37 Next, consider the case where = 1. We verify that there exists an equilibrium by verifying that a sequence of equilibria corresponding to discount factors k ! 1 has a convergent subsequence which is an equilibrium when = 1. This follows from Lemma 1.
Proof of Proposition 1 The case of < 1 is straightforward, so consider the case of = 1. Note that some agent can make a proposal that would be better for a majority than the status quo, so the stationary equilibrium must have some proposal approved with positive probability. If the equilibrium has only dimensions approved together, then it must end in the rst session, as Proposition 4 then applies. So, suppose that there is a positive probability that a proposal is approved which involves only one dimension. This is a contradiction, because by deviating and proposing the suggested y and x i 's, the proposal would be approved and j would be better o . Thus, our original supposition was wrong, and so the same y cannot be in every proposal.
Proof of Proposition 3: Let us verify that X is distributed to an exact majority in an approved decision. Suppose to the contrary. Consider an exact majority C, including the proposer, that weakly prefers the approved decision y; x to the continuation. x j = 0 for j = 2 C. This would necessarily be approved (given the stationarity of strategies and subgame perfection), and so the proposer's decision could not have been a best response, which is a contradiction. Next, we check that each proposer, when recognized in a stationary equilibrium, makes a proposal that is approved immediately. Let d be the ex-ante expected proposal (across all proposers, weighted by their probability of proposing and their mixed strategy of proposing, and probabilities of approval). Given subgame perfection and the (n?1)X 2n to n?1 2 other legislators, the proposal would be approved and would o er j a utility higher than the continuation. Thus, j can make a proposal that would be accepted and o er j a utility higher than the continuation, and so j must be making some approved proposal in equilibrium or there would be an improving deviation. The only candidate for such a proposal is to have j o ering exactly (n?1)X 2n to the other agents, since relative to any proposal where j o ers more, j could do better by o ering slightly less and still have it approved. stationarity of strategies, it must be that any proposal that makes a majority strictly better o is approved. Let v i denote the ex ante expected utility of legislator i. Consider the case of < 1. It must be that u i (d) > v i . Thus any recognized legislator can make a proposal that will make all legislators better o than the continuation and would be approved. This implies that each legislator when recognized makes a proposal that will be approved with some positive probability. Consider a proposer i and some such proposal d in the support of i's proposal strategy that is approved with positive probability. Suppose that the probability of approval of d is less than 1. By the concavity of utility functions, the proposal "d + (1 ? ")d 39 must be strictly better than the continuation for the majority that approves d, since this is true of d. Thus, for any " > 0, "d+(1?")d would be approved with probability 1. For small enough " this o ers a strict improvement over d for proposer i, since d is not approved with probability 1. This is a contradiction of equilibrium. For the case where = 1, this follows the same reasoning, noting from Proposition 4 that the expected equilibrium decision o ers a strictly higher expected utility than the continuation, given strict concavity.
Let us check that the equilibrium is independent of the default. Consider any stationary equilibrium. Given the previous point, every recognized proposer must be making a proposal that is approved in the rst session. Change the default decision. This is still an equilibrium: given the stationary strategies the continuation expectation is the same. There are no in nite strategy deviations by any single legislator that could lead to the default, since with probability 1 the game will end in nite time independent of the deviation (as the legislator is excluded from at least one approved proposal). In this case, legislator 1 always proposes to legislator 2, legislator 3 always proposes to legislator 1, and legislator 2 mixes over proposing to the other two.
Proof of Proposition
Let y ij ; x ij denote the decision proposed by i when proposing to j, and a ij denote the probability that i proposes to j. Proposals are independent of b 3 . Since b 3 is highest, 3 never keeps any X, so the scale of b 3 does not change 3's relative rankings of the proposals.
